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Original Article
Eyes Wide Open: Only Eyes That Pay
Attention Promote Prosocial Behavior
Zoi Manesi1, Paul A. M. Van Lange1, and Thomas V. Pollet1
Abstract
Research from evolutionary psychology suggests that the mere presence of eye images can promote prosocial behavior. How-
ever, the ‘‘eye images effect’’ is a source of considerable debate, and findings across studies have yielded somewhat inconsistent
support. We suggest that one critical factor may be whether the eyes really need to be watching to effectively enhance prosocial
behavior. In three experiments, we investigated the impact of eye images on prosocial behavior, assessed in a laboratory setting.
Participants were randomly assigned to view an image of watching eyes (eyes with direct gaze), an image of nonwatching eyes
(i.e., eyes closed for Study 1 and averted eyes for Studies 2 and 3), or an image of flowers (control condition). Upon exposure to
the stimuli, participants decided whether or not to help another participant by completing a dull cognitive task. Three independent
studies produced somewhat mixed results. However, combined analysis of all three studies, with a total of 612 participants,
showed that the watching component of the eyes is important for decision-making in this context. Images of watching eyes led to
significantly greater inclination to offer help as compared to images of nonwatching eyes (i.e., eyes closed and averted eyes) or
images of flowers. These findings suggest that eyes gazing at an individual, rather than any proxy to social presence (e.g., just the
eyes), serve as a reminder of reputation. Taken together, we conclude that it is ‘‘eyes that pay attention’’ that can lift the veil of
anonymity and potentially facilitate prosocial behavior.
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Individuals care about making a good impression on others,
and they tend to behave prosocially when they believe that they
are being watched and evaluated by others (Kurzban, 2001;
Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Van Bommel, Van
Prooijen, Elffers, & Van Lange, 2012; Van Vugt & Hardy,
2010). In public situations, people commonly behave proso-
cially in expectation of building a positive reputation which
will give them access to valuable social benefits, such as
resources or alliance partners (Kurzban, Burton-Chellew, &
West, 2015; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Panchanathan & Boyd,
2003; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010; Wedekind & Milinski,
2000). Furthermore, in the absence of anonymity, people often
treat others prosocially to avoid social penalties that can result
from failure to cooperate, such as social ostracism (Boyd, Gin-
tis, & Bowles, 2010; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Indeed,
research suggests that reputational mechanisms driving proso-
cial behavior can be elicited not only by the presence of real
observers (e.g., Bereczkei, Birkas, & Kerekes, 2007) but also
by minimal cues of being watched, such as images of eyes or
artificial eyelike shapes (for reviews, see Nettle et al., 2013;
Sparks & Barclay, 2013).
A series of laboratory and online experiments has demon-
strated that the mere display of eye images can enhance various
cooperative acts, including (a) generosity (Baillon, Selim, &
Van Dolder, 2013; Fathi, Bateson, & Nettle, 2014; Haley &
Fessler, 2005; Keller & Pfattheicher, 2011; Oda, Niwa, Honma,
& Hiraishi, 2011; Pfattheicher & Keller, 2015; Rigdon, Ishii,
Watabe, & Kitayama, 2009), (b) contribution to public goods
1 Social and Organizational Psychology, Department of Experimental and
Applied Psychology, Faculty of Behavioural and Movement Sciences, VU
Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Corresponding Author:
Zoi Manesi, Social and Organizational Psychology, Department of Experimental
and Applied Psychology, Faculty of Behavioural and Movement Sciences, VU
Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Email: z.manesi@vu.nl
Evolutionary Psychology
April-June 2016: 1–15
ª The Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1474704916640780
evp.sagepub.com
Creative Commons CC-BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 License
(http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further
permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
(Burnham & Hare, 2007), (c) conformity to social norms or
condemnation of moral transgressions (Bourrat, Baumard, &
Mckay, 2011; Oda, Kato, & Hiraishi, 2015), and (d) conserva-
tion of endangered species (Manesi, Van Lange, & Pollet,
2015). For example, in Haley and Fessler’s (2005) seminal
study, a pair of stylized eyes displayed on participants’ computer
screen was sufficient to increase the likelihood of donating in the
dictator game. Field research has extended the ‘‘eye images
effect’’ to various socially desirable acts in the real world,
including (a) litter cleanup and proecological acts (Bateson,
Callow, Holmes, Roche, & Nettle, 2013; Ernest-Jones, Nettle,
& Bateson, 2011; Francey & Bergmu¨ller, 2012), (b) charitable
giving (Ekstro¨m, 2012; Powell, Roberts, & Nettle, 2012), (c)
voting in elections (Panagopoulos, 2014), (d) abidance by
honesty systems (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006), and (e)
compliance with the law (Nettle, Nott, & Bateson, 2012).
Although images of eyes are obviously a false cue to surveil-
lance (as no one is actually watching or evaluating the behavior of
the individual), in most studies conducted so far, they appear effec-
tive in lifting the veil of anonymity and calibrating social behavior
(but see Cai, Huang, Wu, & Kou, 2015; Carbon & Hesslinger,
2011; Fehr & Schneider, 2010; Raihani & Bshary, 2012; Tane &
Takezawa, 2011; Vogt, Efferson, Berger, & Fehr, 2015). In fact, a
recent work by Pfattheicher and Keller (2015) demonstrates that
images of eyes can indeed elicit a sense of being watched. This
suggests that the feeling of being watched should matter, as it serves
as a reminder of reputation and a tool to enhance prosociality.
However, despite the increased attention to those minimal
cues to social surveillance, it is unclear whether humans modify
their behavior only when the eyes are ‘‘monitoring them,’’ that
is, when the eyes show direct gaze. It is possible that individuals
feel the urge to manage their reputation and act prosocially even
when they are not the focus of eyes’ attention (e.g., when the
eyes are closed or show averted gaze). Eyes that are not watch-
ing may still be a reminder of social presence or even convey
social evaluations. For example, being subjected to an averted
gaze may elicit fears of negative social evaluation because look-
ing away can be a sign of rejection and social ostracism (see,
e.g., Williams, Shore, & Grahe, 1998). We argue that in order to
better understand potential psychological mechanisms behind
the phenomenon, it is important to clarify whether the ‘‘watch-
ing’’ component of the eyes underlies the eye images effect. We
propose two alternative hypotheses. If being the focus of eyes’
attention is a necessary precondition for experiencing reputa-
tional concerns, then people should modulate their behavior only
in the presence of eyes that are watching (i.e., eyes with direct
gaze). An opposing hypothesis suggests that any eyes, be it
watching or nonwatching, can elicit prosocial behavior because
they can be cues of potential social sanctions. Shedding light on
this issue could help clarify the circumstances under which eyes
are a valid signal that reputation is at stake.
When do eyes matter?
There are several reasons for expecting watching eyes to be a
stronger elicitor of prosocial behavior than nonwatching eyes.
For instance, relative to an averted gaze, a direct gaze appears
to exert greater influence on humans. As compared to averted
gaze faces, exposure to staring faces is a more powerful elicitor
of attention, physiological arousal, and neural activation, as
measured by greater galvanic skin responses (Conty, Russo,
et al., 2010; Nichols & Champness, 1971), enhanced activity
of the amygdala (a brain region involved in emotional process-
ing and social evaluations, among other functions; Kawashima,
1999), and the fusiform gyrus (a brain region involved in face
perception; George, Driver, & Dolan, 2001). This is because,
when humans become the target of another’s gaze, they tend to
be highly alert to those watching cues and attentive to the gazer
(Conty, Gimmig, Belletier, George, & Huguet, 2010; Conty,
Russo, et al., 2010).
The profound effects of a direct gaze are not surprising
given that eye contact serves as a precursor to social interac-
tion, conveying the gazer’s state of mind and intentions toward
the other (e.g., threat, interest, sexual attraction, see Kampe,
Frith, & Frith, 2003; Wicker, Perrett, Baron-Cohen, & Decety,
2003), and playing a key role in social cognition. For instance,
as compared to closed eyes or averted eye gaze, seeing
another’s direct gaze enables the perceiver to make faster social
judgments, including attribution of intentionality (i.e., attribu-
tion of animacy and agency in the environment, see Senju &
Johnson, 2009), memory of faces and recognition of individual
identity (Hood, Macrae, Cole-Davies, & Dias, 2003), person
construal and category activation (e.g., gender categorization,
see Macrae, Hood, Milne, Rowe, & Mason, 2002), and decod-
ing of others’ mental states, goals, and intentions (i.e., menta-
lizing, see Kampe et al., 2003; Wicker et al., 2003).
Given the psychological significance of eye contact and
humans’ striking sensitivity to direct eye gaze, one would
expect that the ‘‘watching component’’ of the eyes is a prere-
quisite for triggering a feeling of being monitored. Hence, con-
cerns for one’s own reputation and motivation to acquire social
approval by acting in a prosocial, cooperative fashion should be
higher in the presence of watching eyes rather than nonwatch-
ing eyes (e.g., eyes in a closed state or eyes staring away from
the individual).
However, it is still possible that reputational concerns are
somewhat activated even when the individual is not the target
of eyes’ attention. Nonwatching eyes may also be a cue to
reputation because they are socially salient stimuli that attract
attention and activate brain regions involved in sociality (see,
e.g., Emery, 2000). For example, as compared to other face
parts or inanimate objects (e.g., lips, scrambled faces, or flow-
ers), nonwatching eyes (i.e., eyes with averted gaze and eyes
closed) can elicit larger N170 amplitudes (i.e., a brain response
to faces, see Taylor, George, & Ducorps, 2001; Taylor, Itier,
Allison, & Edmonds, 2001). This suggests that people pay
special attention to eyes (even if those eyes are not watching)
when detecting faces and social presence. Furthermore, mere
exposure to an averted gaze is shown to elicit activity in regions
involved in social cognition, like the superior temporal sulcus
(a brain region involved in the detection of agency, biological
motion, and social attention, see Calder et al., 2002; Hoffman
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& Haxby, 2000) and the medial prefrontal cortex (a brain
region involved in mentalizing, see Calder et al., 2002).
Apart from activating the social brain network, nonwatching
eyes can have important psychological and emotional conse-
quences. Previous research suggests that mere exposure to non-
watching eyes can elicit concerns about belongingness and
personal status (Schmitz, Scheel, Rigon, Gross, & Blechert,
2012; Wirth, Sacco, Hugenberg, & Williams, 2010). For exam-
ple, Wirth et al. (2010) showed that displaying an image of a face
with averted gaze (as compared to a face with direct gaze)
caused participants to experience greater feelings of social
exclusion, greater negative affect, and lower self-esteem. This
suggests that apart from signaling social presence, nonwatching
eyes may also have an evaluative function conveying negative
social evaluation and threatening one’s need to belong. This
seems logical because in contrast to eye contact (which signals
social engagement and attention), averting the gaze (by looking
away or closing the eyes) can signal a lack of interest or social
involvement. An averted gaze, for example, can convey the
sender’s motivational tendencies of avoidance (Adams & Kleck,
2005; Sander, Grandjean, Kaiser, Wehrle, & Scherer, 2007). If
eyes that do not pay attention can elicit fears of negative social
evaluation and rejection, one could argue that they also have the
potential to enhance reputation-based decision-making. Thus, it
is possible that individuals are inclined to engage in conspicuous
displays of prosocial behavior in order to ‘‘be seen,’’ feel
included, and build a positive social reputation. Given the above
lines of reasoning, we aimed to explore if eyes need to be watch-
ing to enhance prosocial behavior.
Measuring prosociality and hypotheses
To test the role of the watching component in the eye images
effect, we used a simple measure of prosocial behavior, namely,
the decision to help another individual at a cost to oneself. Spe-
cifically, we examined the extent to which participants would
show other-regarding preferences by carrying out a dull cogni-
tive task in the laboratory in order to minimize the effort of
another individual into the same task. Deciding to leave the task
unfinished would provide more self-benefit (i.e., energy and
time for oneself), whereas deciding to complete the task would
provide more other-benefit (i.e., energy and time for the other).
Thus, this cognitive task was used to create a so-called mixed
motive situation in which self-benefit and other-benefit conflict
(Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013).
In the three studies reported below, we tested whether an
image of eyes can increase the likelihood of a prosocial alloca-
tion of workload. Aiming to examine the boundary conditions
of the phenomenon, we compared watching eyes against non-
watching eyes and flowers. Specifically, Study 1 tested
whether or not participants will show greater prosocial alloca-
tion of workload when exposed to a pair of watching eyes (i.e.,
eyes open with direct gaze) as compared to eyes in a closed
state or control images of flowers. Studies 2 and 3 tested
whether the superiority of watching eyes over nonwatching
stimuli extends to comparisons with averted gaze. In Studies
2 and 3, we tested whether prosocial allocation of workload
would be greater when exposed to watching eyes as compared
to eyes with averted gaze or control images of flowers.
Study 1
Materials and Methods
Participants and design
The initial sample consisted of 268 Dutch undergraduate students
from a university-wide subject pool. Four psychology students,
who expressed suspicion about the eyes manipulation because
they were already familiar with the eye images effect, were
dropped from the analyses. Also, because the main measure of
prosociality was a completion of a behavioral task that involved
touch-typing, data from 15 participants with dyslexic-type diffi-
culties were eliminated from analyses. Data removal was based
on self-report items assessing dyslexia. This resulted in a final
sample of 249 people (76.3% female; Mage¼ 20.35 years, SD¼
2.36 years). Because we used images of real stimuli, we did not
limit our attention to a single sex category, and we used images of
both male and female eyes. In a between-participants design,
participants were randomly assigned to one of five experimental
conditions: (a) male watching eyes condition (n ¼ 48), (b) male
eyes closed condition (n ¼ 50), (c) female watching eyes condi-
tion (n ¼ 50), (d) female eyes closed condition (n ¼ 51), and (e)
flowers condition (n¼ 50). In this five-condition design, our main
interest was to test whether the two conditions of watching eyes
will differ significantly from the two conditions of eyes closed
and the control condition of flowers. The ethics committee of the
university has approved the present research, and all participants
gave informed consent before participating in the experiment.
Typing task and procedure
The entire experiment was computerized: Instructions and task
were administered via Qualtrics survey software (Qualtrics,
Provo, UT), and participants were seated in individual cubicles
to ensure privacy and anonymity. The experiment consisted of
a simple cognitive task, called the ‘‘typing task,’’ which
involved typing strings of characters with the use of the key-
board (see Appendix A). On each trial of the task, a string of 20
random letters was displayed in the center of the computer
screen, and the participants were asked to type these characters
without errors.
Participants were informed that in this task, they would be
randomly paired with a task partner, who would participate in
the experiment at a later time. According to the cover story,
participants were assigned to the role of Partner A, whereas
their partner was assigned to the role of Partner B in the task.
The participants read that the ultimate goal was to complete the
task, which consisted of 15 typing trials, in total. According to
the instructions, Partner A was to carry out any number of task
trials he or she wished. However, the number of trials carried
out by Partner A would affect the workload of Partner B. If
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Partner A would leave the task unfinished, then Partner B
would be required to complete any remaining task trials in his
or her turn to participate in the experiment. Thus, for example,
if Partner A decided to carry out 10 trials, then Partner B would
be obliged to carry out the remaining five trials in order to
complete the whole task.
Hence, the typing task created a decision context, which
involved outcome dependence: The participant was assigned
to the role of the decision-maker influencing the workload
(outcome) of himself or herself and the task partner, whereas
the task partner had no power over the workload (outcome) of
the participant or the workload (outcome) of himself or herself.
As such, the task created a mixed motive situation resembling
the dictator game, in which one could determine the outcome
for the other (but not vice versa). Prosocial behavior was mea-
sured by (a) the inclination of participants to complete the task
(yes/no) and thus leave no workload for the partner and (b) the
inclination to leave lower workload for the partner (in the case
that participants did not complete the task).
After the typing task, participants provided some demo-
graphic information, were probed for suspicion, and answered
few comprehension questions about task-specific instructions.
They were then debriefed about the aims of the study, thanked,
and given course credit or a show-up fee of €2.50 for participat-
ing in the study. In this experiment, a relatively minor form of
deception was used: Partner B, with whom participants were told
that they were paired, was in fact a fictitious individual.
Eyes manipulation
On each trial of the typing task, a pair of eyes or flowers appeared
above the letter string (see Appendix B). If assigned to the watch-
ing eyes conditions, participants viewed pairs of eyes in an open
state and direct gaze. If assigned to the eyes closed conditions,
participants viewed pairs of eyes in a closed state. Eye stimuli
(240 90 mm in size) were cropped from four standardized facial
photographs of two Caucasian adult men and two Caucasian adult
women with neutral emotional expression. Images were trans-
formed from color to gray scale, and all stimuli were obtained
from a website with a standardized set of facial images (see
www.flickr.com; user profile: Michael Wagenha¨user). Based
on evidence from Sparks and Barclay (2013) suggesting that
humans become habituated to the eye images effect, stimuli in
the current research were displayed on the screen just before the
participant decides whether or not to complete each task trial. The
image remained visible until the participant completed the task
trial or pressed the ‘‘stop’’ button (and, thus, quit the task). To
further prevent habituation, on each task trial, stimuli alternated
between different images of the same set (i.e., set of watching
eyes, set of eyes closed, or set of flowers).
Statistical Analyses
We analyzed the data using the following models: zero-inflated
Poisson (ZIP) models, zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB)
models, zero-altered Poisson (ZAP) models, and zero-altered
negative binomial regression (ZANB) models (Lambert, 1992;
Martin et al., 2005; Mullahy, 1986; Welsh, Cunningham, Don-
nelly, & Lindenmayer, 1996; Zuur, Ieno, Walker, Saveliev, &
Smith, 2009). The zero-altered modeling approach allows com-
bining two separate analyses, one for the yes/no decision (com-
plete or not complete the task) and one for the counts (trials left
behind), into a single model. Zero-inflated and zero-altered
models do not differ in fit indices; we therefore report the
parameter estimates (with watching eyes as reference cate-
gory), standard errors, and significance tests for the zero-
altered models, though the corresponding zero-inflated models
showed the same effects.
The analyses were implemented using R Version 3.1.3 (R
Development Core Team, 2008) and use the ‘‘pscl’’ package
(Jackman, 2008) for modeling ZIP, ZINB, ZAP, and ZANB.
The data and R code are provided as Electronic Supplementary
Material (see ESM 3). We also ran a combined analysis where
we combined the data from the three experiments. For combined
analysis, we also modeled a fixed effect for study and the inter-
action between study and the condition variable. In addition, we
explored the possibility of random effect models via the
‘‘glmmadmb’’ package (Supplementary Table 1; ESM 2; see
Skaug, Fournier, Nielsen, Magnusson, & Bolker, 2011).
Detailed information about the selection of the statistical models
and the nature of the data is provided as ESM (see ESM 1). We
rescored the data such that higher scores indicated more task
trials left to be carried out by the partner and zeros indicated
zero trials left behind (i.e., the participant completed the entire
task). Finally, we ran extra analyses with flowers as the reference
group and provided descriptive statistics for each of the three
studies (Supplementary Tables 2-4; ESM 2).
Results and Discussion
Our data provided partial support for the primary hypotheses.
As shown in Table 1, both the eyes closed and flowers condi-
tions differed significantly from the watching eyes condition in
terms of the expected count distribution (Figure 1A). Partici-
pants who did not complete the task left significantly fewer
trials behind when exposed to images of watching eyes (M ¼
5.02, SD ¼ 2.23, Mdn ¼ 5), as opposed to images of eyes
closed (M ¼ 6.65, SD ¼ 3.12, Mdn ¼ 6) or flowers (M ¼
6.50, SD ¼ 2.93, Mdn ¼ 6).
Results showed no significant differences between watching
eyes and eyes closed or flowers in terms of task completion
(yes/no; see Figure 3A). Yet, it can be noted that the percentage
of participants completing the task in the watching eyes con-
dition was 56.1%, whereas in the closed eyes and flowers con-
ditions, it was 48.5% and 48%, respectively. The contrasts
between eyes closed and flowers were also not significant
(count model: p ¼ .825; zero hurdle model: p ¼ .952). If we
combine the eyes closed and flowers conditions and compare
them to the watching eyes condition, we obtain a similar result
(count model estimate: 0.282+ 0.092, p ¼ .002; zero hurdle
estimate: 0.312 + 0.261, p ¼ .231).
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Figure 1. (A–C). Histograms depicting the number of task trials that the participants did not perform. Higher scores indicate higher number of
task trials that the participants did not perform.
Manesi et al. 5
Thus, in line with our hypothesis, participants who did not
complete the task and were exposed to images of watching eyes
left significantly fewer trials behind than those in the other
conditions. However, images of watching eyes did not seem
to increase the likelihood of completing the task, in comparison
with images of eyes closed or flowers. Furthermore, results
showed no effect of the sex of eyes.
Study 2
The first study provided some initial support for the hypothesis
that it is specifically the gaze of the eyes that elicits prosocial
behavior. However, it is unclear whether prosocial behavior is
affected only by eyes staring at the individual or just by the
mere presence of any gaze. To test this alternative interpreta-
tion of our results, we conducted a replication of Study 1, but
we included a condition of eyes with averted gaze instead of the
condition of eyes closed. Do eyes that pay attention elicit
greater levels of prosocial behavior than eyes that look away?
Materials and Methods
Participants and design
Following deletions for dyslexic tendencies (n ¼ 10), the final
sample consisted of 190 people (65.3% female; Mage ¼ 22.17
years, SD ¼ 7.21 years). In a between-participants design,
individuals were randomly assigned to one of five experimen-
tal conditions: (a) male watching eyes condition (n ¼ 36), (b)
male averted eyes condition (n ¼ 41), (c) female watching eyes
Table 1. Parameter Estimates (and Standard Errors) for Zero-Altered
Negative Binomial Models for Study 1 (Zero Hurdle Model [Task Com-
pletion or Not] and Counts Model [Number of Trials Left Behind]).
Model 1
Count model: (intercept) 1.60*** (0.08)
Count model: watching eyes versus flowers 0.27* (0.12)
Count model: watching eyes versus eyes closed 0.29** (0.10)
Count model: log(y) 3.11*** (0.63)
Zero model: (intercept) 0.25 (0.20)
Zero model: watching eyes versus flowers 0.33 (0.35)
Zero model: watching eyes versus eyes closed 0.31 (0.28)
AIC 932.12
Log likelihood 459.06
Number of observations 249
Note. AIC ¼ Akaike information criterion.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 2. Parameter Estimates (and Standard Errors) for Zero-Altered
Negative Binomial Models for Study 2 (Zero Hurdle Model [Task Com-
pletion or Not] and Counts Model [Number of Trials Left Behind]).
Model 1
Count model: (intercept) 2.17*** (0.08)
Count model: watching eyes versus flowers 0.10 (0.13)
Count model: watching eyes versus averted eyes 0.16 (0.11)
Count model: log(y) 2.24*** (0.32)
Zero model: (intercept) 0.19 (0.24)
Zero model: watching eyes versus flowers 0.39 (0.40)
Zero model: watching eyes versus averted eyes 0.22 (0.33)
AIC 815.55
Log likelihood 400.77
Number of observations 190
Note. AIC ¼ Akaike information criterion.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 4. Parameter Estimates (and Standard Errors) for Zero-
Altered Negative Binomial Models in All Three Studies Combined
(Zero-Hurdle Model [Task Completion or Not] and Counts Model
[Number of Trials Left Behind]).
Model 1 Model 2
Count model: (intercept) 1.94*** (0.05) 1.69*** (0.06)
Count model: watching eyes
versus flowers
0.12 (0.07) 0.11 (0.07)
Count model: watching eyes
versus nonwatching eyes
0.17* (0.07) 0.17** (0.06)
Count model: log(y) 2.24*** (0.20) 2.76*** (0.26)
Zero model: (intercept) 0.27* (0.13) 0.28 (0.16)
Zero model: watching eyes
versus flowers
0.49* (0.21) 0.49* (0.21)
Zero model: watching eyes
versus nonwatching eyes
0.32 (0.19) 0.32 (0.19)
Count model: Study 1 versus
Study 2
0.47*** (0.06)
Count model: Study1 versus
Study 3
0.29*** (0.07)
Zero model: Study1 versus
Study 2
0.03 (0.19)
Zero model: Study1 versus
Study 3
0.00 (0.20)
AIC 2472.55 2425.15
Log likelihood 1229.28 1201.57
Number of observations 612 612
Note.Model 1 has condition as main effect and model 2 has condition and study
as main effects. AIC ¼ Akaike information criterion.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 3. Parameter Estimates (and Standard Errors) for Zero-
Altered Poisson Models for Study 3 (Zero-Hurdle Model [Task Com-
pletion or Not] and Counts Model [Number of Trials Left Behind]).
Model 1
Count model: (intercept) 2.10*** (0.07)
Count model: watching eyes versus flowers 0.05 (0.10)
Count model: watching eyes versus averted eyes 0.02 (0.10)
Zero model: (intercept) 0.44 (0.27)
Zero model: watching eyes versus flowers 0.77* (0.38)
Zero model: watching eyes versus averted eyes 0.47 (0.38)
AIC 686.12
Log likelihood 337.06
Number of observations 173
Note. AIC ¼ Akaike information criterion.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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condition (n ¼ 37), (d) female averted eyes condition (n ¼ 36),
(e) flowers condition (n ¼ 40). In this five-condition design, our
main interest was to test whether the two conditions of watching
eyes will differ significantly from the two conditions of averted
eyes and the control condition of flowers.
Typing task, eyes manipulation, and procedure
The experimental task and procedure were identical to those of
Study 1 with one exception: The maximum number of trials of
the typing task was raised to 18. Because many participants
completed all task trials in Study 1, this may have led to a ceiling
effect potentially masking the effect of gaze on overall task
performance. Therefore, we increased the required effort for task
completion by increasing the maximum number of trials from 15
to 18. Similar to Study 1, on each trial of the typing task, a pair of
eyes or flowers suddenly appeared above the letter string (see
Appendix B). Participants assigned to the watching eyes condi-
tions viewed pairs of eyes with direct gaze, whereas participants
assigned to the averted eyes conditions viewed pairs of eyes with
averted gazes. Stimuli were obtained from the Radboud Faces
Database (RaFD; Langner et al., 2010). Eye stimuli (240  90
mm in size) were cropped from the facial photographs of 18
Caucasian adult men and women, with neutral emotional expres-
sion (gray scale). As in Study 1, to prevent habituation, stimuli
alternated between different images of the same set and were
displayed on the screen during task trials.
Results and Discussion
Figure 1B displays the distributions, and these resemble the
pattern found in Study 1. However, data from the second study
provided no support to our hypotheses. There were no signif-
icant differences between either the averted eyes or the flowers
condition and the watching eyes condition, either in the
expected count distribution or in the distribution of zeros (all
p >.13; Table 2; Figures 1B and 3B).
Although more participants tended to complete the task
when exposed to watching eyes (54.8%) as compared to
averted eyes (49.4%) or flowers (45%), differences between
groups were nonsignificant. Furthermore, although partici-
pants left fewer task trials behind when exposed to watching
eyes (M ¼ 8.76, SD ¼ 4.22, Mdn ¼ 8) as compared to the
averted eyes (M ¼ 10.31, SD ¼ 4.62, Mdn ¼ 11) or flowers
(M¼ 9.64, SD¼ 3.54, Mdn¼ 10), differences between groups
were nonsignificant. The contrast between averted eyes and
flowers was also not significant (count model: p ¼ .578;
zero hurdle model: p ¼ .655). Pooling the averted eyes and
flowers condition and contrasting these with the watching
eyes condition do not alter this conclusion (count model: p ¼
.164; zero hurdle model: p ¼ .353).
Thus, results from Study 2 provided no support for our
hypothesis. In contrast to results from Study 1, watching eyes
as compared to averted eyes or flowers did not lead to a signif-
icant increase in prosocial behavior, in terms of amount of trials
left to be completed by the partner or likelihood of task comple-
tion. As in Study 1, there was no effect of the sex of eyes.
Study 3
The first two studies produced somewhat inconsistent results
regarding the role of watching eyes in promoting prosocial
behavior. In Study 3, we used images depicting averted eyes
paired with a deviated head orientation. Averting both head and
gaze (compared to averting only the gaze) may be a better
signal that an individual is not paying attention and, therefore,
is not watching (Langton, 2000).
Materials and Methods
Participants and design
Following deletions for dyslexic tendencies (n ¼ 10) and sus-
picion (n ¼ 5), the final sample consisted of 173 Dutch under-
graduate students (76.3% female; Mage ¼ 20.73 years, SD ¼
Figure 2. Histograms depicting the number of task trials that the participants did not perform in all three studies combined. Higher scores
indicate higher number of task trials that the participants did not perform.
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3.61 years). In a between-participants design, individuals were
randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions:
(a) watching eyes condition (n ¼ 56), (b) averted eyes condi-
tion (n ¼ 57), and (c) flowers condition (n ¼ 60).
Typing task, eyes manipulation, and procedure
The task and procedure were identical to those of Study 2. Eye
stimuli were cropped from the facial photographs of 18 Cau-
casian adult men and women (RaFD; Langner et al., 2010),
with neutral emotional expression, averted gazes, and deviated
head orientation (gray scale, see Appendix B). Given that in
Studies 1 and 2, the sex of the eyes did not affect results, in this
study, the sex of the eyes was not manipulated between parti-
cipants, so that participants assigned to the watching eyes or the
averted eyes conditions viewed pairs of both male and female
eyes (in a random order).
Results and Discussion
Data provided partial support for the primary hypothesis. There
was a significant difference between watching eyes and flowers
in the expected task completion (yes/no): Participants in the
watching eyes condition were more likely to complete the
Figure 3. (A–C). Bar graphs depicting the percentage of participants completing the task in each of the three studies. In Study 3, p value for
significant difference between watching eyes and flowers was p < .05 (see Table 3). Remaining p values reveal no significant differences between
other groups (at p < .05).
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entire task than those in the flowers condition (Table 3; Figure
3C). Specifically, the percentage of participants completing the
task was 60.7% in the watching eyes condition, whereas it was
41.7% in the flowers condition.
However, the conditions of watching eyes (M ¼ 8.18, SD ¼
3.14, Mdn¼ 8) and flowers (M¼ 7.77, SD¼ 2.99, Mdn¼ 8) did
not differ significantly in the number of trials left behind (Table
3, Figure 1C). Furthermore, the differences between watching
eyes and averted eyes (M¼ 8.34, SD¼ 3.13, Mdn¼ 8) were not
significant (Table 3), neither for the count nor for the yes/no
distribution (count model: p ¼ .420; zero hurdle model: p ¼
.419). Although greater percentage (60.7%) of participants
tended to complete the task when exposed to watching eyes as
compared to averted eyes (49.1%), differences between groups
were not significant. When we pool the averted eyes and flowers
condition and compare these to watching eyes, we find a statis-
tical trend for completion (zero hurdle estimate: 0.624+ 0.331,
p ¼ .059) but not for the number of trials completed (count
model estimate: 0.019 + 0.087, p ¼ .83).
Thus, results from Study 3 showed that exposure to images of
watching eyes (as compared to images of flowers) led to signif-
icantly greater prosocial behavior, in terms of likelihood of task
completion. However, there were no significant differences in
prosocial behavior between participants exposed to images of
watching eyes and those exposed to images of averted eyes.
All Studies Combined
Given the somewhat inconsistent findings and our similar
designs, we decided to combine the data of all three studies. The
best fitting model contains two main effects, condition and
study, but no interaction between them (Table 4). This suggests
that the overall result is not driven by a particular condition from
a single study. The analyses yielded four major findings.
First, as compared to all other stimuli, images of watching
eyes led to significantly greater levels of prosocial behavior in
the typing task. Specifically, when we pool the flowers and
nonwatching eyes conditions and contrast these with the watch-
ing eyes condition, we find that these contrasts are significantly
different for both the count and the yes/no distribution (count
model estimate: 0.149+ 0.061, p¼ .015; zero hurdle estimate:
0.384+ 0.169; p¼ .023). The task was completed by 56.8% of
participants exposed to watching eyes as opposed to 47.3% of
participants exposed to the other stimuli. Furthermore, if parti-
cipants left some workload to the other individual, the amount
of trials left behind was lower for the watching eyes condition
(M ¼ 6.99, SD ¼ 3.64, Mdn ¼ 6) as compared to all other
conditions (M ¼ 8.09, SD ¼ 3.71, Mdn ¼ 8).
Second, the contrast between nonwatching eyes and flowers
was not significant for expected counts or completion (count
model: p ¼ .486; zero hurdle model: p ¼ .413). Thus, the
nonwatching eyes condition did not significantly differ from
the flowers condition with regard to the number of trials left
behind (M ¼ 8.25, SD ¼ 3.97, Mdn ¼ 8; and M ¼ 7.87, SD ¼
3.31, Mdn ¼ 7, respectively) or the likelihood of completing
the task (48.9% and 44.7%, respectively). This further suggests
that it is the watching component of the eyes that matters for
showing prosocial behavior in the typing task.
Third, focused comparisons between watching eyes and
each of the other conditions yielded the following results. The
watching eyes condition was significantly different from
the flowers condition with respect to completion (Table 4;
Figure 4) but not with respect to expected counts (Figure 2).
Participants were thus significantly more likely to complete the
task when exposed to images of watching eyes (56.8%) com-
pared to images of flowers (44.7%). Furthermore, the watching
eyes condition differed from the nonwatching eyes condition
(i.e., averted eyes and eyes closed) in terms of counts but not in
terms of task completion (Table 4; Figure 2). Participants left
significantly fewer trials behind when eyes were watching
(M ¼ 6.99, SD ¼ 3.64, Mdn ¼ 6), as opposed to when eyes
were not watching them (M ¼ 8.25, SD ¼ 3.97, Mdn ¼ 8).
The overall picture is thus that watching eyes lead to both a
higher completion rate of the task and leaving fewer trials
Figure 4. Bar graph depicting the percentage of participants completing the task in all three studies combined. The p value for significant
difference between watching eyes and flowers was p < .05 (see Table 4). Remaining p values reveal no significant differences between other
groups (at p < .05).
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behind (for those who do not complete it) than the other con-
ditions combined. Specific comparisons show that watching
eyes lead to significantly greater prosocial behavior in terms
of task completion though dependent on the specific contrast
(watching eyes vs. flowers: significantly greater completion/
watching eyes vs. nonwatching eyes: significantly less trials
left behind, when not completed).
General Discussion
The present research aimed to shed light on the circumstances
under which images of eyes can promote prosocial behavior.
In particular, we sought to explore whether eyes need to be
watching in order to elicit prosocial behavior. We tested this
hypothesis in three laboratory studies with a total combined
sample of 612 participants.
Results from each individual study were not always com-
pletely consistent with one another, even though the pattern
was very similar across the three studies. Focusing on the dif-
ferences, we saw that Studies 1 and 3 showed that the tendency
to reduce another’s workload was greater, when presented with
eyes showing direct gaze as compared to control images of
flowers. Furthermore, Study 1 provided support to the idea that
the watching component of the eyes is important: The tendency
to reduce another’s workload was greater, when faced with a
direct gaze, as compared to eyes closed. And finally, Study 2
revealed no effect of eye images, and Study 3 showed no sig-
nificant changes in prosocial behavior when exposed to a direct
gaze as opposed to an averted eye gaze.
Given the mixed results and the prominent similarity with
regard to study design and procedure of all three studies, we
considered it the best approach for now to conduct a combined
analysis to give insight into the bigger picture across the three
studies. Combined analysis of all three studies provided evi-
dence that watching eyes exerted a significant effect, although
with small or modest effect size.
First, as compared to all nonwatching stimuli (i.e., eyes
closed, averted gaze, and flowers), watching eyes led to signif-
icantly greater inclination to help another individual. The pro-
portion of participants completing the task was significantly
higher in the presence of a direct gaze (56.8%) as compared
to all other stimuli (47.3%). Furthermore, participants who left
some workload to the other individual tended to assign signif-
icantly lower amount of task trials when they were exposed to a
direct gaze as compared to all other stimuli.
Second, specific comparisons further clarified the specific
nature of the differences. As compared to control images of
flowers, eyes showing direct gaze significantly increased the
likelihood of completing the task to help another individual.
The proportion of participants completing the task was sig-
nificantly higher in the presence of a direct gaze (56.8%) as
opposed to flowers (44.7%). Although there was no signifi-
cant difference between direct gaze and nonwatching eyes
(i.e., eyes closed and averted eyes) in terms of task comple-
tion, there was a significant difference in terms of trials left
behind: Participants who left some workload to the other
individual tended to assign significantly lower amount of task
trials when they were exposed to direct gaze as compared to
eyes closed and averted gaze.
Thus, the three studies together converge on the tentative
conclusion that eyes are a meaningful cue to reputation when
they are watching. By contrasting direct gaze with averted gaze
and eyes closed, we demonstrated that attempts to build a rep-
utation as prosocial person are more likely to take place when
prosocial acts can be observed and therefore evaluated by oth-
ers. In contrast to eyes directed at an individual, eyes in a
closed state and eyes with averted gaze are unlikely to identify
the individual and thus to remove anonymity. As participants’
behavior does not fall within ‘‘the spotlight of attention’’ any-
more, nonwatching eyes are unlikely to jeopardize one’s rep-
utation or to activate reputation management concerns. Our
findings extend and complement existing knowledge on the
eye images effect (e.g., Bateson et al., 2006; Ernest-Jones
et al., 2011; Haley & Fessler, 2005) by showing that the watch-
ing component of the eyes moderates the effect of eye images
on prosociality. Confirming earlier speculations (e.g., Burnham
& Hare, 2007), the current research provides empirical evi-
dence for the potential relevance of gaze detection mechanisms
that examine whether the honest indicator of monitoring (i.e.,
watching eyes) is there and thus whether reputation is at stake.
The current findings are also in accordance with the broader
literature on the role of reputation concerns in increasing pro-
sociality (i.e., data on image scoring and gossip, Nowak &
Sigmund, 1998; Piazza & Bering, 2008). These data, also,
complement prior work by Tane and Takezawa (2011), who
found that people do not show increased prosocial behavior in
the presence of eyes that cannot recognize the identity of a
person, like eye images presented in darkness. As with the
experience of darkness, a pair of closed or averted eyes may
have elicited a sense of concealment, leading participants to
experience comparably low levels of reputational concerns.
It is worth noting that exposure to images of nonwatching
eyes did not make people act significantly more prosocially
than exposure to images of flowers. Although eyes that are not
paying attention may serve as reminders of social environment,
they appear to be as weak as control stimuli in making people
signal prosocial dispositions. Despite evidence that nonwatch-
ing eyes activate the social brain and have important psycho-
logical implications (Emery, 2000; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000;
Wirth et al., 2010), the present research suggests that they
might not be as powerful as watching eyes in triggering reputa-
tional concerns and in promoting prosocial behavior. For repu-
tational concerns to be activated, the eyes need to be watching
you and not being closed or looking away.
It is also useful to discuss the present findings from methodo-
logical perspectives. First, the findings underline the need for
rigorous statistical approaches that analyze data on the eye images
effect from multiple perspectives (i.e., both binary and count or
continuous data) without compromising statistical power. As in
the case of the typing task, other measures of prosocial behavior
often yield zero-inflated data with the majority of participants
acting prosocially (or not). In the dictator game, for instance, most
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of the participants donate a certain amount rather than no
amount (Engel, 2011). We posit that in such cases, statisti-
cal approaches modeling two steps, decision (yes/no) and/or
the amount to contribute, are perhaps more suitable. In line
with recent discussion on suitable statistics for testing the
eye images effect (Nettle et al., 2013), our data highlight the
importance of more informative models than the traditional
approaches.
Second, it is perhaps not completely surprising that the eye
images effect was somewhat inconsistently observed in each
individual study. After all, various individual studies have dis-
puted the role of eyes in modulating behavior (see, e.g., Fehr &
Schneider, 2010; Raihani & Bshary, 2012; Vogt et al., 2015).
This, in turn, has given rise to a lively debate in the literature
encouraging multiexperiment papers and meta-analytical
reviews in an attempt to shed light on the circumstances under
which eyes do or do not matter (e.g., Cai et al., 2015; Nettle
et al., 2013; Sparks & Barclay, 2013). Therefore, our data also
point to the importance of drawing conclusions regarding the eye
images effect based on multiple studies, rather than on single
studies. Considering that the present research was the first
attempt to explore the moderating role of eye gaze (to our knowl-
edge), future research using different behavioral paradigms is
needed to further explore the phenomenon. Also, it is important
to note that our three studies yielded very similar findings for the
contrast between nonwatching eyes and the flower conditions.
In general, the present research advances the state of knowl-
edge on the eye images effect in various ways: (a) showing that
eye gaze conveys a signal that is fundamental in enhancing pro-
sociality, (b) using a noneconomic approach to the effect of eye
images on prosocial behavior in the laboratory, and (c) underlying
the importance of considering alternative statistical analyses for a
better understanding of data on the eye images effect.
One limitation of the present research is the use of grayscale
resolution stimuli, which may be less realistic (as compared to
full color stimuli) and may therefore dampen the eye images
effect. The reason behind the use of grayscale images was to
eliminate the possibility that color differences may affect per-
ception of stimuli or participants’ mood and behavior (Elliot &
Maier, 2007; Fink, Grammer, & Matts, 2006; Kleisner, Kocˇnar,
Rubesˇova´, & Flegr, 2010). Future studies could consider explor-
ing whether more (vs. less) realistically looking stimuli can
modulate the effect of watching eyes. A second limitation con-
cerns the use of flower images as control stimuli. Although
various studies on the eye images effect and other phenomena
have used images of flowers as ‘‘neutral’’ control stimuli (see
e.g., Bateson et al., 2006; Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004; Ernest-
Jones et al., 2011; Francey & Bergmu¨ller, 2012; O¨hman &
Mineka, 2003), the neutrality of those stimuli may be debated.
Future research could offer insights into the boundary conditions
of the eye images effect by juxtaposing the effect of eyes against
that of various other controls and perhaps also different cues to
social presence (e.g., images of other face parts, voice cues).
A third limitation is that the present research is restricted
solely to samples of university students, and thus results cannot
yet be generalized broadly (see also Henrich, Heine, &
Norenzayan, 2010). Despite the homogeneity of the participant
pool, convenience samples of undergraduate students are likely
to have higher scores of intelligence (including emotional intel-
ligence) as compared to the general population. Given that the
eye images effect has been debated in the literature (see, e.g.,
Fehr & Schneider, 2010; Raihani & Bshary, 2012; Vogt et al.,
2015), the present findings need replication ideally via more
diverse samples. Furthermore, future studies could consider
exploring the role of potential moderators of the effect of watch-
ing eyes. Prior research has underlined the influence of
individual differences (e.g., in regulatory focus or public self-
awareness, see Keller & Pfattheicher, 2011; Pfattheicher &
Keller, 2015) in the phenomenon. Considering that our research
revealed small to modest effects, testing the role of individual
differences in the eye images effect could be a promising avenue
for future research.
Conclusions
The extant literature suggests that reminders of reputation, in
the form of human eyes, promote human cooperation and pro-
sociality. We extend this general argument by arguing that it is
not merely the eyes as such that promote prosociality: It is the
eyes that pay attention. In particular, we suggest that it is eyes
that pay attention and seem to play a key role as a reminder of
reputation, serving as a key mechanism promoting prosocial
behavior. As such, we see two broad contributions of our arti-
cle. Empirically, it contributes to getting a grip on the incon-
sistency in findings of the eyes-images effect. Theoretically,
we suggest that the reminder of reputation is in the eye gaze.
This seems logical because reward and punishment often start
with signals conveying approval or disapproval. Such signals
clearly have functional value in that they are effective and
efficient tools for regulating individual members within a
social group. Indeed, ‘‘looking away’’ does not convey this
signal and may even signal the complete absence of approval
or disapproval. Thus, we close with the tentative conclusion
that it is the signal rather than the eyes as such that serve as a
reminder of reputation—and it is those social signals that help
individuals to enact prosocially oriented behaviors.
Appendix A
Example trial of the typing task with a picture of watching eyes
(Studies 2 and 3, RaFD; Langner et al., 2010).
Please type the following characters:
wvzrgydizkfhjtgbrjuf
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Appendix B
Example pictures of watching eyes, averted eyes, and flowers
used in Studies 2 and 3 (RaFD; Langner et al., 2010).
(a) Watching eyes trial in Studies 2 and 3.
(b) Averted eyes trial in Study 2.
(c) Averted eyes trial in Study 3.
(d) Flowers trial in Studies 2 and 3.
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